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BREAKING THE ICE: EXPANDING THE CLASS
OF "ISSUE" TO INCLUDE POSTHUMOUSLY
CONCEIVED CHILDREN
DANIEL C. PERRONE*
INTRODUCTION
People are pretty much alike. It's only that our differences are more
susceptible to definition than our similarities. 1
Imagine you were a posthumously conceived child.2 Your mother and
father were just getting accustomed to married life, when your father was
diagnosed with cancer. Suddenly, your parents' hopes and dreams of having
a long, happy marriage-which included children-flashed before their
eyes. Fearing the worst, your father deposited a sample of his semen at a
sperm bank with instructions that it be cryopreserved, and that, in the event
of his death, it be held subject to the directions of your mother. Shortly
thereafter, your father succumbed to his illness and passed away. Following
your father's death, your mother underwent numerous attempts to
impregnate herself, until finally, three years later, she conceived a child-
You.
Your paternal grandmother, having been a single mother herself, knew
the difficulties that your mother would soon face and offered to help in any
way possible. As the years passed, your grandmother filled the void left by
your father's death and became a second mother to you, until she too passed
away nearly ten years after you were born. To ensure that her family would
be provided for, your grandmother executed a will that left her entire estate
* Editor-in-Chief, St. John's Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development, 2012-2013; J.D., St.
John's University School of Law, 2013.
1 Kevin G. Barkes, And So It Goes..., KGBREPORT.COM (Aug. 15, 2012, 6:46 AM),
http://www.kgbreport.com/archives/abc-world-news-now/index.shtml (quoting Linda Elerbee).
A posthumously conceived child is "a child conceived after the death of [his or her parent]-
through... assisted reproduction ." William H. Danne, Jr., Annotation, Legal Status of Posthumously
Conceived Child of Decedent, 17 A.L.R. 6th 593 (2006).
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to her "issue."3 However, since you were not conceived during your father's
lifetime, you may not be considered a permissible beneficiary of this "class
gift.",4
The above example illustrates a situation where a child was conceived
after his or her father's death. It is important to note that it is also possible
for a child to be conceived after the death of his or her mother.5 Imagine
that your mother, a member of the United States' Armed Forces, had just
learned that she would soon be deployed for combat. After receiving this
news, your mother arranged to have her eggs frozen and, in the event of her
untimely death, used by your father to conceive a child. Admittedly, this
scenario differs from the above example, namely, because a surrogate
mother6 would be needed to carry out this process. In the end, however, the
result is the same-you face the possibility of being denied inheritance
rights simply because of the unfortunate circumstances surrounding your
conception.
Although you are probably wondering how it is possible that you may
not qualify as a beneficiary of your grandmother's will, the answer is quite
simple. In New York, legislative action has failed to keep pace with the
rapid advancements in biotechnology. 7 These advancements, specifically
the ability to cryopreserve semen, eggs, and embryos, have enabled a
person to produce a genetically related child even after his or her death.8
However, they have also led to a host of legal issues that have received
only minimal attention. 9
In an effort to resolve one of the issues raised by the advancements in
biotechnology, this Note addresses whether, and to what extent, New
York's Estates, Powers and Trusts Law ("EPTL") should be amended to
expand inheritance rights-under a class gift-to certain posthumously
conceived children. Currently, New York's EPTL § 2-1.3 defines a class
gift as "a disposition of property to persons described in any instrument as
3 "Issue are the descendants in any degree from a common ancestor." N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS
LAW § 1-2.1 0(a)(1) (McKinney 2008).
4 See infra text accompanying note 10.
5 See infra Part I.A.
6 A surrogate mother is "[a] woman who carries out the gestational function and gives birth to a
child for another... typically on behalf of an infertile couple." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1106 (9th
ed. 2009).
7 See infra Part ll.A.
8 See infra text accompanying notes 21-24.
9 See Danne, Jr., supra note 2 (noting that only a limited number of decisions have addressed the
question of the legal status of a posthumously conceived child); Jenna M. F. Suppon, Note, Life After
Death: The Need to Address the Legal Status of Posthumously Conceived Children, 48 FAM. CT. REV.
228, 229 (2010) ("The complicated nature of the conception of these children has led to a host of legal
questions and issues that have received only minimal attention.").
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the issue, children, descendants ... (or by any term of like import) of the
creator or of another. .. ."10 A disposition to beneficiaries described by
those terms encompasses several types of children, including non-marital
childrenlI and children conceived before, but born alive after, disposition
of the gift becomes effective. 12 It does not include posthumously conceived
children.13 As a result, there is an increasing population of children who
have been, or face the possibility of being, excluded from inheriting as
members of the class of issue. 14
To remedy this problem, this Note proposes an amendment to New
York's EPTL that would expand the class of issue to include certain
posthumously conceived children. To do so, this amendment would focus
on the grantor's intent to include the posthumously conceived child as a
beneficiary of the class gift. Once, and if, such intent has been established,
this amendment would impose three additional requirements that the child
must satisfy to qualify as a class member. First, maternity or paternity must
be established by clear and convincing evidence. Second, the deceased
parent must have consented in writing to the posthumous use of his or her
genetic material, as well as designated a person to control its use. Finally,
the child must be conceived before a member of the class becomes entitled
to distribution.
In essence, this amendment would treat posthumously conceived
children like any other potential class member, provided that the above-
mentioned requirements are satisfied. 15 Those requirements are designed to
act as safeguards to protect the grantor's intent, the rights of other class
members, and the rights of posthumously conceived children. 16 Moreover,
they would greatly reduce any potential for fraud, while providing certainty
and finality in the administration of estates. 17
For illustrative purposes, this Note focuses on situations where the
creator of the class gift and the child's deceased parent are two different
10 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.3(a) (McKinney 2008).
11 Id. § 2-1.3(a)(3).
12 Id. § 2-1.3(a)(2).
13 See infra Part II.A.
14 See A03051, 2011-2012 Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011), available at
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default fld=&bn=A03051 &term=2011 &Summary-Y&Actions=Y&Vo
tes=Y&Memo=Y&Text=Y [hereinafter Assembly Bill] (stating that "[tihere is an increasing population
of children who have been excluded as heirs of their parents [sic] estates due to the inability of our laws
to keep pace with the rapid evolution of technology."); see also Joseph H. Karlin, Note, "Daddy, Can
You Spare A Dime?": Intestate Heir Rights of Posthumously Conceived Children, 79 TEMP. L. REV.
1317, 1339 (2006).
15 See infra Part I1I.A.1.
16 See infra Part III.A.2.
17 See infra Part IlI.B.
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individuals, such as in the hypotheticals presented above. In an effort to
provide clarity throughout this Note, the term "grantor" refers to the creator
of the class gift and the term "deceased parent" refers to the parent, or
potential parent, of the posthumously conceived child. However, it is
important to note that this amendment would apply with equal force to
situations where the grantor and the deceased parent are the same person.
This Note is divided into three main parts. Part I of this Note will discuss
the development of Artificial Reproductive Technologies ("ART"), as well
as the increased use, and societal acceptance, of ART worldwide. It will
explain the defining characteristics of a class gift, highlighting some of the
legal issues and policy concerns raised by children conceived through the
use of ART, specifically, posthumously conceived children. Part II will
discuss the inadequacies of New York's current class gift statute, EPTL §
2-1.3. It will also analyze the In re Martin B. decision, which illustrates one
of the new challenges that the legislature must face as a result of
advancements in biotechnology. Part III will discuss possible amendments
to New York's EPTL that would expand the class of "issue" to include
certain posthumously conceived children. Next, it will compare this Note's
proposed amendment to the New York State Assembly's proposed bill,
illustrating the key differences between these proposals by way of the
hypothetical posed at the beginning of this Note. Finally, it will address
concerns that opponents have raised regarding the extension of inheritance
rights to posthumously conceived children, explaining how the safeguards
implemented by this Note's proposed amendment adequately address such
concerns.
I. THE GROWING "CLASS" OF POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED CHILDREN
This Section will explore the development of ART, as well as the issues
raised by children conceived through the use of such technology,
specifically, posthumously conceived children. Section A will provide a
brief summary of the most commonly used methods of ART, illustrating
the vast increase in use, and societal acceptance, of this technology. Section
B will then explain what a "class gift" is, detailing the defining
characteristics of such gifts. In addition, it will highlight some of the legal
issues and policy concerns raised by posthumously conceived children in
the context of class gifts.
EXPANDING TUE CL4SS OF "ISSUE"
A. The Science Behind Posthumous Conception
Initially, the development of ART brought hope to families who could
not procreate by natural means. 18 Since its inception, ART has enabled
millions of people throughout the world to have biological children who
otherwise would not have been able to do so. 19 However, due to rapid
advancements in biotechnology, the use of ART has been expanded to
facilitate the process of posthumous conception. 20
ART encompasses a variety of technologies, "the oldest, simplest, and
most widespread method is the [cryopreservation] of male sperm for later
implantation in the woman or for the fertilization of an egg in vitro."21
Cryopreservation is a method employed to preserve reproductive material
at extremely low temperatures for extended periods of time outside of the
body.22 Cryopreservation has become so prevalent that it is common sperm
bank policy to freeze all semen deposits to enhance preservation. 23 As a
result, reproductive materials, such as semen, eggs, and embryos, can be,
and are being, preserved for periods of time that could exceed ten years,
thus enabling a child to be conceived from such genetic material long after
18 Robert Harper, Dead Hand Problem: Why New York's Estates, Powers and Trusts Law Should
Be Amended to Treat Posthumously Conceived Children as Decedents' Issue and Descendants, 21
QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 267, 268 (2008); Ronald Chester, Freezing the Heir Apparent: A Dialogue on
Postmortem Conception, Parental Responsibility, and Inheritance, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 967, 971 (1996)
("In its early years, assisted reproduction seemed a benign intervention of science, helping families bear
children who could not do so naturally.").
19 Emily Galpem, Assisted Reproductive Technologies: Overview and Perspective Using a
Reproductive Justice Framework, CTR. FOR GENETICS & SOC'Y 1 (2007), available at
http://geneticsandsociety.org/downloads/ART.pdf; Kristy Horsey, Three Million IVF Babies Born
Worldwide, IVF.NET (June 28, 2006), http://www.ivf.net/ivf/three-million-ivf-babies-bom-worldwide-
o2105.html.
20 See Jamie Rowsell, Stayin' Alive: Postmortem Reproduction and Inheritance Rights, 41 FAM.
CT. REV. 400, 400 (2003) ("The scientific discovery of the ability to cryogenically freeze and preserve
reproductive material and the ability to harvest gametes from the deceased has facilitated the process of
postmortem reproduction."); Jenna Suppon, Note, Life After Death: The Need to Address the Legal
Status of Posthumously Conceived Children, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 228, 230 (2010) (discussing how
reproductive technology has made it possible for children to be conceived a number of years after the
death of one of their biological parents).
21 Chester, supra note 18, at 973 (emphasis added). Other popular methods of assisted
reproduction include: artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization, gamete intrafallopian transfer, and
zygote intrafallopian transfer. Suppon, supra note 20, at 230. Each of those methods could be used to
facilitate the process of posthumous conception. Id.
22 Rowsell, supra note 20, at 401; see Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Steven H. Snyder, Clarifying the
Law of ART. The New American Bar Association Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive
Technology, 42 Fain L.Q. 203, 211 n.35 (2008). To facilitate this process, a small amount of glycerol is
added to the reproductive material before freezing, to ensure that it remains viable after thawing, and it
is stored in liquid nitrogen at temperature of minus 328 degrees Fahrenheit. Rowsell, supra note 20, at
401.
23 Sheri Gilbert, Note, Fatherhood from the Grave: An Analysis of Postmortem Insemination, 22
HOFSTRA L. REV. 521, 525 (1993); Christopher Scharman, Note, Not Without My Father: The Legal
Status of the Posthumously Conceived Child, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1001, 1006 (2002).
2014
374 JOURNAL OF CIVL RIGHS & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT [Vol. 27:2
the death of his or her biological parent. 24
The circumstances that motivate people to use ART vary widely. People
suffering from serious illnesses, such as cancer or Hodgkin's lymphoma,
have utilized ART to provide for the continuation of their lineage in the
event of their untimely death or as insurance against future infertility due to
sterilizing treatments. 25 In addition, many soldiers being deployed for
combat have utilized this technology by having their sperm or eggs frozen
and stored to ensure their ability to produce a child in the event they do not
return from battle, are so seriously injured they cannot conceive naturally,
or are exposed to sterilizing chemical agents. 26 Regardless of the
motivating circumstances, those who use ART have one thing in common:
the desire to have a genetically related child.2 7
Currently, ART is gaining widespread acceptance and societal approval.
Since 1978, when the world's first "test tube"2 8 baby was born, more than
three million babies have been produced through the use of ART.29 A study
conducted in 2002 estimated that ART is now responsible for
approximately 219,000 to 246,000 babies born each year worldwide. 30 This
marks a significant increase from 1989, just five years after the first birth
from a frozen embryo occurred, 31 when only 30,000 babies were born
24 See Rowsell, supra note 20, at 401; Gilbert, supra note 23, at 526 ("Sperm which has been
stored for over ten years has produced healthy children.").
25 Gilbert, supra note 23, at 526 ("Other common uses for the storing of sperm for later
insemination include insurance against future infertility due to chemotherapy or radiation treatment,
vasectomy, or exposure to toxic substances.").
26 See Robert Harper, Dead Hand Problem: Why New York's Estates, Powers and Trusts Law
Should Be Amended to Treat Posthumously Conceived Children as Decedents' Issue and Descendants,
21 QU1NNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 267, 268-69 (2008) (discussing how soldiers marching off to war are using
artificial reproduction technologies to ensure their ability to procreate); Gilbert, supra note 23, at 526
(stating that activity at sperm banks increases greatly in times of war).
27 See Emily Galpern, Assisted Reproductive Technologies: Overview and Perspective Using a
Reproductive Justice Framework, CTR. FOR GENETICS & SOC'Y 1, 5 (2007), available at
http://geneticsandsociety.org/downloads/ART.pdf (explaining that people are motivated to use ART to
have a genetically related child); Anne R. Dana, Note, The State of Surrogacy Laws: Determining Legal
Parentage for Gay Fathers, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'vY 353, 360 (2011); see also Weldon E.
Havins & James J. Dalessio, The Ever- Widening Gap Between The Science of Artificial Reproductive
Technology and the Laws Which Govern That Technology, 48 DEPAUL L. REv. 825, 825 (1999).
28 For purposes of this Note, the term "test tube" baby refers to a child born through the use of in
vitro fertilization.
29 Kirsty Horsey, Three Million IVF Babies Born Worldwide, IVF.NET (June 28, 2006),
http://www.ivf net/ivf/three-million-ivf-babies-bom-worldwide-o2105.html.
30 Jacques de Mouzon et al., Int'l Comm. for Monitoring Assisted Reprod. Tech., World
Collaborative Report on Assisted Reproductive Technology, 2002, 24 HuM. REPROD. 2310, 2316
(2009), available at http://humrep.oxfordjoumals.org/content/24/9/2310.full.pdf. It is important to note
that the term "ART" in this sentence encompasses all forms of Artificial Reproductive Technologies,
including artificial insemination. Additionally, although this study was conducted in the year 2002,
these figures represent the most recent data available.
31 First Baby Born of Frozen Embryo, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 1984),
http://www.nytimes.com/1984/04/11/us/first-baby-bom-of-frozen-embryo.html.
EXPANDING THE CLASS OF "ISSUE"
worldwide as a result of ART.32 Additionally, that study found that in just
two years, from 2000 to 2002, the number of ART procedures increased by
more than twenty-five percent.33 As these figures demonstrate, the number
of ART procedures, as well as the number of children produced therefrom,
is growing steadily.
B. The Impact of Posthumously Conceived Children on Class Gifts
In New York, the Estates Powers and Trusts Law ("EPTL") governs the
validity, effect, and interpretation of class gifts. 34 Specifically, EPTL
Section 2-1.3-New York State's class gift statute--defines a class gift as
"a disposition of property to persons described in any instrument as the
issue, children, descendants... (or by any other term of like import) of the
creator or of another."35
There are two defining characteristics of a class gift. First, a "group
label" is used to describe the beneficiaries. A group label identifies the
beneficiaries by a common characteristic that is shared by all current and
potential class members.3 6 In most cases, this common characteristic
pertains to a degree of family relationship, such as "issue" or
"descendants. "'37
Second, the beneficiaries are intended to take as a group. This means that
class membership is not static.3 8 Rather, class membership is "subject to
fluctuation by increase or decrease." 39 "Increase in a class occurs when a
new member is added to the class," such as when a child is born or
32 Horsey, supra note 29.
33 Mouzon, supra note 30, at 2314.
34 New York State's EPTL governs the validity, effect, and interpretation of class gifts of personal
property where the grantor was domiciled in New York. See Margaret Valentine Turano, Practice
Commentary, McKinney's Cons, Laws of N.Y., Book 17B, EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-5.1(c)
(McKinney 2002); see also id. § 7-1.10. Additionally, New York State's EPTL governs the disposition
of real property where that property is located within New York. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §
3-5.1(b) (McKinney 2008).
35 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.3(a).
36 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 13.1 (Tentative
Draft No. 4, 2004). Although this is only a tentative draft, it has been approved in principle by the
American Law Institute ("ALI"). Lawrence W. Waggoner, Class Gifts Under the Restatement (Third) of
Property, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 993, 995 (2007). Even though it has been approved by the ALI, it is
important to note that the Restatement is not a binding source of law. Courts, however, have looked to
such secondary sources for a reflection of the public's evolving attitude toward emerging legal issues,
including the inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children. See, e.g., In re Martin B., 841
N.Y.S.2d 207, 211 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2007).
37 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 13.1 cmt. c
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2004); Waggoner, supra note 36, at 995, 997.
38 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS. § 13.1(a)(1)
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2004); Waggoner, supra note 36, at 995.
39 Waggoner, supra note 36, at 995.
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adopted.40 On the other hand, decrease in class membership "occurs when a
class member is excluded from the class on account of death... or some
other reason." 4 1
Fluctuation in class membership becomes important in determining the
shares of each class member. Once a class member becomes entitled to
distribution, the gift is divided among the then-entitled class members on a
fractional basis. 42 This means that an increase in class membership would
result in an abatement of the existing class members' shares,43 whereas a
decrease in class membership would result in an enlargement of the
existing class members' shares. 44
At some point, the ability of a class to increase or decrease must come to
an end. Certainty and finality in determining the members of a class are
critical to society's interest in the orderly administration of estates.45
Accordingly, estates cannot be held open for years to allow for the mere
possibility that a posthumously conceived child may come into existence at
some indeterminable point in time.46 At the same time, however, donative
intent and the rights of posthumously conceived children deserve respect
and the legislature must take them into account.47
In New York, the ability of a class to increase or decrease seemingly
comes to an end when disposition of the class gift becomes effective.48
40 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 13.1 cmt. h
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2004); accord Waggoner, supra note 36, at 1003.
41 Id. § 13.1 cmt. h (stating that two of the other reasons for decrease in class are when a class
member is excluded from the class on account of divorce or disqualification); Waggoner, supra note 36,
at 1005.
42 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 13.1(a)(2)
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2004); Waggoner, supra note 36, at 995.
43 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 13.1 cmt. h; accord
Wagoner, supra note 36, at 1003.
" Id. § 13.1 cmt. h.
45 In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207, 211 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2007); David M. Becker, A Critical
Look at Class Gifts and the Rule of Convenience, 42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 491, 494 (2007)
(stating that courts adopt the rule of convenience, which excludes potential family members from class
gifts, to ensure "timely distribution in a manner that is administratively convenient to courts,
representatives, and trustees").
46 Eugene E. Peckham, Eugene E. Peckham on Inheritance Rights of Posthumously Conceived
Children, 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 492; In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1262 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 2000).
47 See In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d at 211; Melissa B. Vegter, Note, The "ART" of Inheritance: A
Proposal for Legislation Requring Proof of Parental Intent Before Posthumously Conceived Children
Can Inherit from a Deceased Parent's Estate 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 267, 289-90, 292 (2003) (discussing
the balancing of interests the legislature must consider in adopting statutes providing for the inheritance
of posthumously conceived children).
48 See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.3(a)(2) (stating that a disposition of property to
persons described as issue, includes "[c]hildren conceived before, but born alive after such disposition
becomes effective") (emphasis added).
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This does not occur when the class gift is actually distributed. 49 Rather, the
disposition of a class gift becomes effective when a class member becomes
entitled to his or her share. 50 For instance, if the class gift takes effect upon
the grantor's death, as in the hypothetical posed at the beginning of this
Note, the disposition of the class gift becomes effective when the grantor
dies.51
However, things are not always as they seem. EPTL Section 2-1.3 has
failed to keep pace with the rapid advancements in biotechnology, such as
the ability to cryopreserve semen, eggs, and embryos, which have made it
possible for a person to produce a genetically related child even after he or
she has passed away. 52 As a result, there is an increasing population of
children who have been, or may soon be, excluded as members of the class
of issue,53 despite the fact that they otherwise qualify as members of that
class. 54
II. WHO QUALIFIES AS "ISSUE" IN NEW YORK
This Section examines whether, and to what extent, posthumously
conceived children, in New York, may inherit as members of the class of
issue. Section A will discuss the current statutory provisions of EPTL § 2-
1.3, which establish who qualifies as a member of the class of issue. Next,
Section B will analyze the In re Martin B. decision-the only New York
case to directly address the inheritance rights of posthumously conceived
children in the context of a class gift.
A. New York's Current Statutory Provision for Class Gifts
New York's EPTL Section 2-1.3, read literally, seems to include
posthumously conceived children as members of the class of issue. For
49 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 15.1 cmt. b
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2004); see also In re Unborn Child, 683 N.Y.S.2d 366, 369 (Fam. Ct. Suffolk
Co. 1998) ("'Although the child's property interest is not realized until birth, it is recognized while the
child is yet a fetus."') (quoting Gloria C. v. William C., 476 N.Y.S.2d 991, 995 (Fam. Ct. Richmond Co.
1984)).
50 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1,5.1, cmt. b.
51 Id. It is worth noting that the distribution date for a postponed class gift taking effect on the
death of the income beneficiary is the time of death of the income beneficiary, not when the corpus of
the trust is actually distributed. Id. For example, in In re Martin B., all seven trust instruments provided
that, at Abigail's death, the principal was to be distributed to Martin B.'s issue. Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d
at 208. In that case, Abigail was Martin B.'s wife, as well as the income beneficiary of the trusts. Id.
Thus, the distribution date of those trusts would be the time of death of Abigail.52 See infra Part H.A.
53 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
54 See infra Part III.A.2.
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instance, EPTL Section 2-1.3(a)(2) provides that a disposition of property
to persons described in any instrument as issue, includes "[c]hildren
conceived before, but born alive after such disposition becomes
effective." 55 On its face, this provision focuses on the time when
disposition becomes effective, not on the circumstances surrounding the
child's birth. Thus, it would seem that posthumously conceived children,
conceived prior to disposition, would be included in the class of issue,
despite having been conceived after the death of their biological parent.
Likewise, EPTL Section 2-1.3(a)(3) ostensibly bears upon the
inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children. That section
extends inheritance rights under a class gift to certain "non-marital
children." 56 EPTL Section 2-1.3(a)(3) creates a presumption that a non-
marital child is the legitimate child of his mother and, therefore, is entitled
to inherit as his mother's issue.5 7 On the other hand, a non-marital child
must meet the burden of proof set forth in EPTL Section 4-1.2 to qualify as
his father's issue.58 In other words, a non-marital child may inherit from his
father and paternal kindred, only if paternity is established by clear and
convincing evidence. 59 Since posthumously conceived children are always
non-marital children, they appear to qualify under this section, provided
they satisfy Section 4-1.2.60
However, a literal construction of these provisions proves to be
problematic. These provisions were enacted in 1966,61 twelve years before
the first successful in vitro fertilization was performed 62 and eighteen years
before the first birth from a frozen embryo occurred. 63 In other words,
EPTL Section 2-1.3 was enacted long before the legislature could have
55 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.3(a)(2) (emphasis added).
56 Id. § 2-1.3(a)(3).
57 Id. ("A non-marital child is the child of a mother."). It is likely that § 2-1.3(a)(3) adopted this
presumption from § 4-1.2(a)(l), which provides that "[a] non-marital child is the legitimate child of his
mother so that he and his issue inherit from his mother and from his maternal kindred." Id. § 4-
1.2(a)(1); Margaret Valentine Turano, Supp. Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y.,
Book 17B, EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 2-1.3 (2011) (explaining that a non-marital child will share in the
gift if he or she meets the burden of proof set forth by § 4-1.2).
58 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.3(a)(3) (stating that a non-marital child is the child of a
father if the child is entitled to inherit from such father under § 4-1.2).
59 Id. § 4-1.2(a)(2)(C); Cf Helene S. Shapo, Matters of Life and Death: Inheritance Consequences
of Reproductive Technologies, 25 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1091, 1099 (1997) (explaining that some states
even allow the exhumation of a father's body after death for DNA testing to prove paternity with clear
and convincing evidence).
60 Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 266-67 (Mass. 2002) ("Because death ends
a marriage, posthumously conceived children are always non-marital children."); see Callow v.
Thomas, 78 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Mass. 1948).
61 See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.3.
62 See supra text accompanying note 28.
63 See supra text accompanying note 3 1.
EXPANDING TIE CLASS OF "ISSUE"
anticipated that children could be posthumously conceived.64 Accordingly,
as the practice commentary explains, EPTL Section 2-1.3 only extends
inheritance rights to children that were conceived during their parents'
lifetimes, not those conceived thereafter.65
B. The In re Martin B. Decision
The In re Martin B. decision illustrates one of the new challenges that
the New York State Legislature must address as a result of the rapid
advancements in biotechnology. On December 31, 1969, Martin B., the
grantor, executed seven trust agreements, which gave the trustees discretion
to sprinkle principal to and among his issue during the life of his wife,
Abigail. 66 These instruments also provided that, at Abigail's death, the
principal was to be distributed to Martin B.'s issue, unless Abigail
exercised her special testamentary power to transfer the trusts' assets to
other eligible appointees. 67
On July 9, 2001, Martin B. died, survived by Abigail and their son
Lindsay, who had two adult children. Martin B. was predeceased by his son
James.68 After being diagnosed with Hodgkin's lymphoma, James
deposited a sample of his semen at a laboratory with instructions that it be
cryopreserved, and that, in the event of his death, it be held subject to the
directions of his wife, Nancy.69 When James died, on January 13, 2001, he
had no children. 70 Years later, Nancy underwent in vitro fertilization and
gave birth to two boys, James Mitchell and Warren, three and five years
after his death, respectively. 71 As a result, the trustees brought this
proceeding to determine whether James Mitchell and Warren were issue for
purposes of the trusts' provisions, despite having been conceived several
years after the death of their father.72
The court began its discussion by noting that New York does not have a
statute directly addressing the rights of posthumously conceived children.73
64 In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207, 210 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2007).
65 Id.; see also, Margaret Valentine Turano, Supp. Practice Commentary, McKinneys Cons. Laws
of N.Y., Book 17B, EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 2-1.3 (2007) ("[T]he legislature, when it referred to
children born posthumously, meant children in utero at the decedent's death.").
66 In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d at 207-08.
67 Id. at 208.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 209. At present, the court noted, the right of a posthumous child to inherit in intestacy
(EPTL § 4-1.1) or as an after-born child under a will (EPTL § 5-3.2) is limited to a child conceived
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Since legislative action failed to keep pace with the progress of science, the
court turned to other sources for a reflection of the public's evolving
attitude toward assisted reproduction, including statutes in other
jurisdictions that directly address this issue, model codes, and Restatements
of the Law.74
The court determined that these sources attempt to balance competing
interests. 75 "On the one hand, certainty and finality are critical to the public
interests in the orderly administration of estates. On the other hand, the
human desire to have children, albeit by biotechnology, deserves respect, as
do the rights of the children born as a result of such scientific advances." 76
To achieve such balance, most jurisdictions require written consent to the
posthumous use of genetic material and establish a cutoff date by which the
child must be conceived, typically two to three years after the deceased
parent's death.77
Turning to the trustees' concerns, the court found that the absence of
Martin B.'s specific intent to include James Mitchell and Warren as
beneficiaries of the trusts was not controlling. 78 Rather, the court stated that
"where a governing instrument is silent, children born of this new
during the decedent's lifetime. Id. However, the court concluded that these provisions were not
applicable to the case at hand because they only applied to intestacy and to wills where the after-born
child was the child of the testator, rather than the child of a third party. Id. at 209-10. Moreover, the
court found that the concerns related to winding up a decedent's estate differ from those related to
identifying whether a class disposition to a grantor's issue includes a child conceived after the father's
death, but before the disposition became effective. Id. at 210. The court also analyzed EPTL §§6-5.7
and 2-1.3. Id. Although the court noted that these statutes, read literally, would allow posthumously
conceived children to claim benefits as biological offspring, it ultimately concluded that the legislature
did not anticipate that these provisions would apply to such children. Id. Rather, the court stated that the
legislature presumably contemplated that these provisions would apply only to children who were
conceived during their parents' lifetimes. Id.
74 Id. at 209 ("In the absence of binding authority, courts must turn to less immediate sources for a
reflection of the public's evolving attitude toward assisted reproduction-including statutes in other
jurisdictions, model codes, scholarly discussions and Restatements of the law.").
75 Seeid. at211.
76 Id.
77 See id. at 210-11. In Louisiana, a posthumously conceived child may inherit from his or her
father if the father consented in writing to the use of his semen and the child was born within three
years of the father's death. Id. at 210 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1 (2003)). Likewise, in
California, the parent must have consented in writing to the posthumous use of genetic material and the
child must have been conceived within two years of the parent's death. Id. (citing CAL. PROB. CODE §
249.5 (Deering 2006)). The Uniform Parentage Act, which has been adopted, in part, by at least seven
states, including Delaware, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming,
requires written consent by both the man and the woman. Id. at 210-11 (citing UNF. PARENTAGE ACT §704 (2000)).
78 Id. at 211 ("Although it cannot be said that in 1969 the grantor contemplated that his 'issue' and
'descendants' would include children who were conceived after his son's death, the absence of specific
intent should not necessarily preclude a determination that such children are members of the class of
issue."). In support of this assertion the court adopted the rationale of the Restatement (Third) of
Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers § 14.8 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2004), namely, if an
individual considers a child to be his or her own, society through its laws should do so as well. Id.
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biotechnology with the consent of their parent are entitled to the same
rights 'for all purposes as those of a natural child.'"79 Since Martin B.
intended to benefit all members of his lineage equally, the court held that
James Mitchell and Warren were issue for all purposes of the trusts. 80
At the end of its opinion, the court stated that comprehensive legislation
is necessary to resolve the issues raised by advancements in
biotechnology. 81 The court, therefore, stated that it was going to send a
copy of its decision to the respective chairs of the Judiciary Committees of
the New York State Senate and Assembly.82
III. EXPANDING THE CLASS OF "ISSUE" TO INCLUDE POSTHUMOUSLY
CONCEIVED CHILDREN
Posthumously conceived children and children conceived during their
parents' lifetimes are essentially alike, yet New York's EPTL distinguishes
them from one another merely because of the circumstances surrounding
their birth. Section A will discuss two proposed amendments to New
York's EPTL that would eliminate this distinction by expanding the class of
issue to include certain posthumously conceived children. Section B will
then address several arguments raised by those who oppose expanding
inheritance rights to posthumously conceived children.
A. Amending New York's Estates, Powers and Trusts Law
To expand the class of issue to include certain posthumously conceived
children, the New York State Legislature should enact legislation that
directly addresses this issue. As mentioned earlier, certainty and finality in
determining the members of a class are critical to society's interest in the
orderly administration of estates.83 Currently, there is an absence of
79 Id. (quoting In re Park, 207 N.E.2d 859, 861 (N.Y. 1965)).
80 See id. at 211-12 (internal citations omitted):
Although James probably assumed that any children born as a result of the use of his
preserved semen would share in his family's trusts, his intention is not controlling here. For
purposes of determining the beneficiaries of these trusts, the controlling factor is the
grantor's intent as gleaned from a reading of the trusts agreements. Such instruments
provide that, upon the death of the grantor's wife, the trusts fund would benefit his sons and
their families equally. In view of such overall dispositive scheme, a sympathetic reading of
these instruments warrants the conclusion that the grantor intended all members of his
bloodline to receive their share.
Id.
81 Id. at 212.
82 Id.
83 See supra text accompanying notes 75-77.
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binding authority on this issue and, as a result, courts must turn to other,
less immediate sources for a reflection of the public's attitude toward
assisted reproduction. 84  Rather than leave this issue to judicial
interpretation, the New York State Legislature should enact legislation that
directly addresses this issue and adequately provides for society's interest in
the orderly administration of estates, as well as the rights of posthumously
conceived children.
a. The New York State Assembly's Proposed Amendment
Several members of the New York State Assembly have sponsored a bill
that would expand the class of issue to include certain posthumously
conceived children. 85 These Assembly members claim that it is imperative
that this legislation be passed, as there is an increasing population of
children who have been excluded as heirs of their parents' estates due to the
inability of the law to keep pace with the rapid evolution of technology. 86
In an attempt to remedy this problem, they have sponsored a bill that
would amend New York's EPTL by adding a new section: EPTL Section 4-
1.3.87 Under this section, a posthumously conceived child would be
considered the legitimate, non-marital child of his or her deceased parent.88
This enactment would entitle the posthumously conceived child to any and
all rights, privileges, and benefits granted a non-marital child, including the
right to inherit as the issue of his or her deceased parent and parental
kindred.89
To qualify under EPTL Section 4-1.3, three requirements must be
satisfied. First, maternity or paternity must be established by clear and
convincing evidence. 90 Presumably, this requirement stems from the fact
84 See supra text accompanying notes 73-74.
85 Assembly Bill, supra note 14. This bill is sponsored by Assembly Members Crystal Peoples-
Stokes, Darryl Towns, Deborah Glick, Earlene Hooper, Jonathan Bing, Keith Wright, Nick Perry,
Vivian Cook, and William Boyland. Id. The most recent action regarding this bill occurred on January
4, 2012 when the proposed legislation was referred to the Judiciary Committee. Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. ("The estates, powers and trusts law is amended by adding a new section 4-1.3.").
88 Id. (stating that a child entitled to inherit under this section would be considered a non-marital
child and the legitimate child of his or her maternal or paternal progenitor, as the case may be).
89 Id. ("Any and all rights, privileges and benefits granted a non-marital child, as defined in section
4-1.2 of this part, including rights to any support payments administered by a state department or
agency, shall be granted to a posthumously conceived child provided the requirements of this section
are met."). Since § 2-1.3(a)(3) extends inheritance rights under a class gift to non-marital children, it
follows that such rights, privileges, and benefits would include the right to inherit under EPTL § 2-
1.3(a)(3). See supra text accompanying notes 56-60.
90 Assembly Bill, supra note 14 (stating that paternity or maternity must be established by clear
and convincing evidence); see Lawrence W. Waggoner, Class Gifis Under the Restatement (Third) of
Property, 33 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 993, 995 (2007).
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that posthumously conceived children are non-marital children and,
therefore, must qualify under EPTL Section 4-1.2 to inherit from or
through their parents. 91 Although EPTL § 4-1.2 creates a presumption of
maternity, 92 that presumption is stricken by this bill, which would require
clear and convincing evidence of maternity or paternity. 93
Second, the deceased parent must have signed an instrument during his
or her lifetime indicating that he or she intended to parent the future child
and that it was his or her intent to provide support for the child.94 This
requirement appears to follow other jurisdictions that have directly
addressed the inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children. Both
California and Louisiana require the deceased parent to have consented in
writing to the posthumous use of his or her genetic material. 95 However,
this requirement seems most akin to that imposed by the Uniform
Parentage Act ("UPA"). In addition to written consent, the UPA requires
intent to be the parent of the child, which presumably encompasses
providing support for the child.96
Finally, the child must be conceived within two years of his or her
parent's death.97 This requirement is in accord with the handful of
jurisdictions that have enacted statutes directly addressing the inheritance
rights of posthumously conceived children. For instance, in California a
91 See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2(a) (McKinney 2010) (establishing the
requirements that a non-marital child must satisfy in order to inherit from his mother or father, as well
as his maternal or paternal kindred).
92 See id. (stating that "[a] non-marital child is the legitimate child of his mother so that he and his
issue inherit from his mother and from his maternal kindred.") (emphasis added).
93 Assembly Bill, supra note 14.
94 Id.
The deceased progenitor signed an instrument during his or her lifetime indicating his or
her intent to parent the future child, and indicating his or her intent to provide support for
such future child, provided that such instrument is acknowledged or executed or proved in
the presence of one or more witnesses and acknowledged by such witness or witnesses, in
either case, before a notary public.
Id.
95 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5 (Deering 2006) (stating that the parent must have consented in
writing to the posthumous use of his or her genetic material); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1 (2012)
(stating that a posthumously conceived child may inherit if the parent consented in writing to the use of
genetic material).
96 DEL. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 8-704 (2000) (stating that a man who intends to be a parent of a
child must consent, in a record, to all forms of assisted reproduction); Id. § 8-707 (2000) ("[T]he
deceased individual is not a parent of the resulting child unless the deceased [individual] consented in a
record that if assisted reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased individual would be a parent
of the child."). Currently, the Uniform Parentage Act has been adopted, in part, by seven states,
including Delaware, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. See In re
Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207, 210 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2007).
97 Assembly Bill, supra note 14 (stating that a child conceived posthumously within two years of
the date of death of his or her maternal or paternal progenitor shall be considered a non-marital child
and the legitimate child of such maternal or paternal progenitor, as the case may be).
384 JOURAAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS&ECONOAfC DEVELOPMENT [Vol. 27:2
posthumously conceived child must have been conceived within two years
of the deceased parent's death to inherit. 98 Similarly, in Louisiana, a
posthumously conceived child may inherit if the child was born within
three years of the deceased parent's death. 99
The Assembly's proposed bill would be a step in the right direction
toward extending inheritance rights to certain posthumously conceived
children. However, in the context of a class gift, it simply does not go far
enough to effectuate donative intent or to protect the rights of
posthumously conceived children.
b. The Amendment that the New York State Legislature Should Enact
To address the inadequacies presented by EPTL Section 2-1.3 as well as
those presented by the Assembly's proposed bill, this Note proposes an
amendment to New York's EPTL that would focus on the grantor's intent to
include the posthumously conceived child as a beneficiary of the class gift.
Once such intent is established, this amendment would impose three
additional requirements that must be satisfied in order for the child to
qualify as a class member. First, maternity or paternity must be established
by clear and convincing evidence. Second, the deceased parent must have
consented in writing to the posthumous use of his or her genetic material.
Finally, the child must be conceived before a class member becomes
entitled to distribution.
As a threshold inquiry, it must be determined whether the posthumously
conceived child was an intended beneficiary of the class gift. In the absence
of a contrary intention, this amendment would create a presumption that the
grantor intended to include the posthumously conceived child as a class
member, thereby entitling him to inherit as a beneficiary of the class gift.
The reasoning behind this presumption is twofold. First, one of the
defining characteristics of a class gift is that the beneficiaries are intended
to take as a group.100 This means that membership of the class may
increase or decrease prior to the time when a class member becomes
entitled to his or her share. 101 Thus, the grantor is, or at least should be,
aware that new members may be added to the class through natural or
artificial means.
98 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5 (stating that in order for a posthumously conceived child to
inherit, the child must have been conceived within two years of the decedent's death).
99 LA. REV. STAT. AN. § 9:391.1 (2003) (stating that a posthumously conceived child may inherit
if the child was born within three years of the decedent's death).
100 See supra Part I.B.
101 See supra text accompanying note 39.
EXPANDING THE CLASS OF "ISSUE"
Second, the term "class gift" refers to a disposition of property to
beneficiaries who are described by a group label. 102 There is no
requirement that the grantor express his specific intent to benefit individual
class members. 103 In fact, if the grantor expresses his specific intent to
benefit individual class members, a presumption could arise that the
disposition is not a class gift, but is to the beneficiaries as individuals. 104
Therefore, the grantor's intent to benefit all class members equally would
be interpreted to include all those who otherwise qualify as class members,
including those conceived posthumously through the use of ART. 105
Once it is determined that the grantor intended to include the
posthumously conceived child as a beneficiary of the class gift, maternity
or paternity must be established by clear and convincing evidence. This
requirement stems from the fact that posthumously conceived children are
non-marital children and must qualify under EPTL Section 4-1.2 to share in
the gift. 106
There is, however, a matter that must be addressed regarding EPTL
Section 4-1.2. As mentioned earlier, EPTL Section 4-1.2 creates a
presumption of maternity.107 Due to advancements in biotechnology,
however, it is now possible for a child to be conceived after his or her
mother's death.108 Thus, similar to the Assembly's proposed bill, this
amendment would eliminate the presumption of maternity by requiring
clear and convincing evidence of maternity or paternity. 109
102 See supra Part I.B.
103 See supra text accompanying notes 35-37 (explaining that a class gift is a disposition of
propry to persons described by a group label, such as issue or descendants).
See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Class Gifts Under the Restatement (Third) of Property, 33 OHIO
N.U. L. REv. 993, 995 (2007) ("If the terms of the disposition identify the beneficiaries by a group label
and either by name or by the number of beneficiaries who then fit the group label ... , the disposition is
rebuttably presumed not to create a class gift, but is to the beneficiaries taking as individuals.");
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 13.2(b)(2) (2011).
105 See supra text accompanying note 79.
106 See Margaret Valentine Turano, Practice Commentary, McKinneys Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book
17B, Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 2-1.3 (2008) (explaining that if a grantor makes a disposition to
"children" or "issue," a non-marital child will share in the gift if she meets the burden of proof set forth
by EPTL § 4-1.2); Elizabeth A. Hartnett, 2002-2003 Survey of New York Law: Estates and Trusts, 54
SYRACUSE L. REv. 1051, 1070 (2004).
107 See supra note 92.
108 See supra Part I.A (explaining how the ability to cryopreserve genetic material, such as semen,
eggs, and embryos, has made it possible for children to be conceived a number of years after the death
of one their biological parents).
109 See supra text accompanying notes 90-93 (discussing how the Assemblys proposed bill has
stricken the presumption of maternity by requiring clear and convincing evidence of maternity or
paternity); Catherine Belfi, Note, Birth of a New Age: A Comprehensive Review of New York
Inheritance Law Responding to Advances in Reproductive Technology, 24 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 113, 141 (2009). Such evidence may include, but is not limited to, evidence derived from a
genetic marker test. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2(a)(2)(C)(i); In re Estate of
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Next, the deceased parent must have consented, in writing, to the
posthumous use of his or her genetic material. Generally speaking, this
requirement is in agreement with the weight of modem authority that has
directly addressed this issue.110 However, it differs from the Assembly's
proposed bill, which leaves open the question of who is entitled to use the
deceased parent's genetic material and what restraints are imposed on such
use.111
To remedy this defect, this requirement would mandate that the deceased
parent designate a person to control the use of his or her genetic material.
Although most cases will likely involve married couples,11 2 the deceased
parent may designate an unmarried man or woman, such as a boyfriend or
girlfriend, to control the use of his or her genetic material. 113 Even though
the deceased parent must designate a person to control the use of his or her
genetic material, the deceased parent would have complete authority to
restrain its use and disposition to third parties. In other words, the deceased
parent may limit the person or persons who are eligible to produce a child
using his or her genetic material.
Finally, the child must be conceived before a member of the class
becomes entitled to distribution. This requirement differs from the handful
of jurisdictions that have enacted statutes addressing this issue, as well as
from the bill proposed by the New York State Assembly. 114 For instance,
the Assembly's proposed bill closes the class of issue two years after the
deceased parent's death, excluding all children born thereafter from
inheriting as a beneficiary of the class gift.1 15 The imposition of such a
rigid time constraint undermines one of the defining characteristics of a
class gift: fluctuation by increase or decrease until the time when a class
member becomes entitled to his or her share. 116
These rigid time constraints serve to perpetuate the archaic distinction
between children conceived during their parents' lifetimes and those
Bonanno, 745 N.Y.S.2d 813, 814 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2002).
110 See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
111 See supra Part HI.A.1.
112 E.g., In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2007). In that case, the deceased
father, James, deposited a sample of his semen with instructions that it be held subject to the directions
of his wife. Id. at 208.
113 See Hecht v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr.2d 222, 223-24 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that
the decedent had the right to determine whether his sperm could be used for reproductive purposes, and
this right included the ability to authorize posthumous insemination of an unmarried woman, namely,
Hecht's girlfriend, at the time of his death).
114 See supra text accompanying notes 97-99.
115 See supra note 97.
116 See supra text accompanying note 39.
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conceived posthumously. In some instances, these time constraints have the
effect of bestowing a superior status upon the posthumously conceived
child. For example, a posthumously conceived child who is born after a
class member becomes entitled to distribution, but before the two-year time
period expires, would be entitled to inherit, despite the fact that the class
would be closed to other future entrants. Additionally, by focusing on the
date of the deceased parent's death, as opposed to the date when the
disposition becomes effective, these rigid time constraints disrupt the
public's interest in certainty and finality in the orderly administration of
estates.' 17
In other instances, however, these time constraints place posthumously
conceived children at an unfair disadvantage. For instance, they would
prevent a posthumously conceived child from inheriting where the
distribution date arises more than two years after the deceased parent's
death, despite the fact that the child may have been conceived, or even
living, prior to the time that disposition became effective. Thus, aside from
placing posthumously conceived children at an unfair disadvantage, such
rigid time constraints directly contradict the Assembly's justification for its
proposal, namely, the fact that there is an increasing population of children
who have been excluded as heirs of their parents' estates.11 8
The third requirement imposed by this amendment would eliminate that
archaic distinction, while providing for the orderly administration of
estates. On one hand, this requirement would provide certainty and finality
in the administration of estates by closing the class of issue on the date
when a class member becomes entitled to distribution. This would prevent
the occurrence of situations, where the posthumously conceived child
would be entitled to inherit, despite being conceived after a class member
became entitled to, or received, her share. On the other hand, it would
respect the rights of posthumously conceived children by treating them like
any other potential class members. In other words, this requirement would
eliminate the distinction between children conceived during their parents'
lifetimes and those conceived posthumously through the use of ART. In
doing so, this requirement would adopt EPTL Section 2-1.3(a)(2)119 as the
third and final requirement that must be satisfied for a posthumously
117 See infra Part HI.B.
118 See supra text accompanying note 86.
119 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.3(a)(2) ("[A] disposition of property to persons
described... as... issue ... includes: [c]hildren conceived before, but born alive after such disposition
becomes effective.").
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conceived child to qualify as a member of the class of issue. 120
c. Do You Qualify as Your Grandmother's Issue?
Think back to the hypothetical posed at the beginning of this Note and
ask yourself: do you qualify as your grandmother's issue? As you may have
already realized, that answer depends on whether you apply this Note's
proposed amendment ("Amendment 1"), or the Assembly's proposed bill
("Amendment 2"). Under Amendment 1, you qualify as a member of the
class of your grandmother's issue. Amendment 2, on the other hand,
reaches a different result and excludes you from the class of permissible
beneficiaries under your grandmother's will. Although it may be difficult to
understand how you could possibly be excluded from the class of your
grandmother's issue, there are two main differences between these
proposed amendments that cause these differing results.
First, these amendments employ two different class-closing rules.
Similar to the statutes in other jurisdictions, Amendment 2 imposes a rigid
two-year time constraint during which conception must occur. 121 To put
this in perspective, think back to the time you spent with your grandmother.
The two of you had an extremely close and loving relationship for nearly
ten years. So close that she became a second mother to you, yet
Amendment 2 does not consider you to be her issue because you were not
conceived within two years of your father's death, 122 despite the fact that
you were born before any other class member became entitled to
distribution. 123 Amendment 1 avoids this unfair, arbitrary result by treating
you like any other class member. 124 Since you were born before any other
class member was entitled to his or her share, you qualify as a member of
the class of your grandmother's issue.125
120 The third reqUirement of this Note's proposed amendment-that the child be conceived before
a class member becomes entitled to distribution-merely adopts EPTL § 2-I.3(a)(2) as one of the
requirements that must be satisfied in order for a posthumously conceived child to inherit. Even though
the third requirement of this Note's proposed amendment is not in accord with the Assembly's proposed
bill (or other jurisdictions for that matter), it is in accord with New York State's current law. Thus, this
requirement would simply expand the breadth of New York State's current law in order to account for
advancements in biotechnology.
121 See supra text accompanying notes 97-99.
122 See supra note 97.
123 Since you were bom nearly ten years before your grandmother passed away, it is clear that you
would were born well before any other class member became entitled to distribution. See supra note 51
and accompanying text (explaining that the disposition of a class gift-taking effect on the grantor's
death-becomes effective when the grantor dies).
124 See supra Part II.A.2.
125 See supra Part III.A.2 (requiring that the child must be conceived before a member of the class
becomes entitled to distribution).
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Second, Amendment 2 ignores the grantor's intent to benefit the
posthumously conceived child. Rather, it focuses on the deceased parent's
intent to support the child.126 Although your father instructed the sperm
bank that his semen were to be held subject to your mother's directions, he
failed to indicate his intent to provide you with support. That is not to say
that he did not want to provide you with support, but that he merely failed
to comply with a statutory formality. As a result, Amendment 2 precludes
you from inheriting as your grandmother's issue. Under Amendment 1,
however, your father's intent to support you is not controlling. 127 Rather,
the controlling factor is your grandmother's intent to include you within the
class of permissible beneficiaries under her will. 128 After all, it would be
illogical to exclude you as a beneficiary under your grandmother's will,
which evidences her donative intent, due to your father's failure to indicate
his intent to provide you with support. Since your grandmother intended to
benefit all members of her lineage equally, Amendment 1 effectuates her
intent by including you as a beneficiary under her will. 129
B. How This Note's Proposed Amendment Would Ease Opponent's
Concerns
It is often argued that granting posthumously conceived children
inheritance rights may lead to fraud and other forms of unethical behavior
that may negatively impact the distribution of estates. 130 Essentially, the
argument is that a person may undergo posthumous reproduction in order
to graft his or her child onto the deceased parent's family tree for
inheritance purposes.
Although it is a real concern that some people may be willing to exercise
such extreme measures, this Note's proposed amendment would implement
two safeguards to prevent such occurrences. First, the grantor must intend
to benefit the posthumously conceived child.131 Admittedly, this
requirement is not very stringent since there is a presumption that such
126 See supra note 94.
127 However, it is important to remember that there may be situations where the deceased parent is
also the grantor. In such cases, the deceased parent's intent to benefit the child would be controlling.
128 See supra Part III.A.2.
129 See supra text accompanying note 105.
130 Sharona Hoffman, Birth After Death: Perpetuities and the New Reproductive Technologies, 38
GA. L. REV. 575, 603 (2004) (arguing that expanding inheritance rights to posthumously conceived
children would result in enhanced opportunities for fraud and other forms of unethical behavior that
affect the disposition of testator's estates); Jenna M. F. Suppon, Note, Life After Death: The Need to
Address the Legal Status of Posthumously Conceived Children, 48 FAM. CT. REv. 228, 239 (2010)
(making the same argument as the Hoffman article).
131 See supra Part III.A.2.
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intent exists.I32 However, if the grantor feels that this may become a
problem, he could take steps to protect himself simply by expressing a
contrary intention in the terms of the class gift. 133
Second, the deceased parent must have consented in writing to the
posthumous use of his or her genetic material and designated a person to
control its use. 134 Since the deceased parent would be free to restrain the
use of his or her genetic material, this safeguard poses a much higher
threshold in which a posthumously conceived child must clear to qualify as
a class member.135 For instance, if someone who was not entitled to use the
deceased parent's genetic material used such genetic material to produce a
child, that child would be precluded from claiming a share of the class gift.
As a result, the opportunity for fraud is de minimis and should not stand in
the way of expanding inheritance rights to posthumously conceived
children.
It has also been argued that allowing posthumously conceived children
to inherit as the issue of their deceased parents may infringe on the
inheritance rights of existing class members. 136 Some argue that expanding
class membership to include posthumously conceived children will
increase class membership, thereby resulting in an abatement of the
existing members' shares. 137 Applying this rationale, it could be argued that
membership of a class should be closed off to any and all new members,
including those born or adopted after the class gift is executed, because
they too would reduce the shares of the existing class members.
That argument simply fails to understand what it means to take as a
group. When executing a class gift, the grantor impliedly expresses his
intent that class membership is subject to fluctuation by increase or
decrease, until the time when a class member becomes entitled to his or her
share.138 Thus, the grantor accounts for the possible abatement in the
existing class members' shares when determining the disposition he wishes
132 Id.
133 This Note's proposed amendment would only create a presumption of intent in the absence of a
contrary intention. Id. Thus, if the grantor provides otherwise in the terms of the class gift, the
presumption would be rebutted and the child would not be entitled to a share of the gift.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Jamie Rowsell, Stayin' Alive: Postmortem Reproduction and Inheritance Rights, 41 FAM. CT.
REv. 400, 411 (2003) ("Opponents also argue that allowing posthumous children to inherit from their
deceased [parent] may infringe on the inheritance rights of children born during the decedent's
lifetime."); Jenna M. F. Suppon, Note, Life After Death: The Need to Address the Legal Status of
Posthumously Conceived Children, 48 FAM. CT. REv. 228, 239 (2010) (making the same argument as
the Rowsell article).
137 See supra text accompanying note 43.
138 See supra Part I.B.
EXPANDING THE CLASS OF "ISSUE"
to bestow upon the class.
Opponents have also raised inefficiency of distribution as a problem with
allowing posthumously conceived children to inherit.139 This argument is
simply not borne out. Although society has a strong interest in identifying
the persons interested in an estate and finality in its distribution,140 the
concerns related to winding up the grantor's estate differ from those related
to identifying whether the class of a grantor's issue includes a child
conceived after one of his or her parent's death, but before a member of the
class becomes entitled to distribution.141 Moreover, the requirement that
the posthumously conceived child be conceived before a class member
becomes entitled to distribution would provide certainty and finality in the
administration of estates. 142
These arguments do have some merit when considered in the context of
the Assembly's proposed bill. The Assembly's proposed bill could infringe
on the inheritance rights of other class members, as well as cause
inefficiency in the distribution of estates. For instance, the Assembly's
proposed bill requires the child to have been conceived within two years of
his or her parent's death. 143 By focusing on the date of the deceased parent's
death, a situation could arise where a posthumously conceived child is
entitled to inherit under the class gift, despite being born after a class
member became entitled to, or even received, his or her share.144 Thus, the
Assembly's proposed bill could create a situation where there would need
to be an abatement in the existing class members' shares after they have
already received, and possibly disposed of, their entitlement.145 However,
once the safeguards of this Note's proposed amendment are satisfied, there
is no reason to differentiate between posthumously conceived children and
children conceived during their parents' lifetimes. As one court put it,
"[p]osthumously conceived children may not come into the world the way
the majority of children do. But they are children nonetheless."146
139 Rowsell, supra note 136, at 411 (stating that the issue of indeterminacy of estate distribution
has been raised as a problem with posthumous children's ability to inherit); see also Suppon, supra note
136, at 239 (making the same argument as the Rowsell article).
140 See supra text accompanying note 76.
141 See In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207, 210 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2007); see also Benjamin C.
Carpenter, A Chip Off the Old Iceblock, How Cryopreservation Has Changed Estate Law, Why
Attempts to Address the Issue Have Fallen Short, and How to Fix It, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
347,400 (2011).
142 See supra Part mI.A.2.
143 See supra note 97.
144 See supra Part III.A.2.
145 See supra text accompanying note 43.
146 Woodward v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 266 (Mass. 2002).
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CONCLUSION
In New York, the definition of "issue" has failed to keep pace with the
rapid advancements in biotechnology. These advancements, specifically the
ability to cryopreserve semen, eggs, and embryos, have made it possible for
a person to produce a genetically related child even after his or her
death.14 7 They have also led to a host of legal issues that have not yet been
directly addressed by the New York State Legislature.14 8 As a result,
innocent children are suffering the consequences of the legislature's failure
to sync the law with technology. Clearly, the law needs reform to directly
address the issues raised by posthumously conceived children.
To address this inadequacy, the New York State Legislature should enact
the amendment proposed by this Note. This amendment would expand the
class of issue to include certain posthumously conceived children, thereby
providing posthumously conceived children with the same rights, benefits,
and privileges that other children enjoy.149 Additionally, this amendment
would ease opponents' concerns by implementing safeguards to prevent the
occurrence of fraud, to protect the rights of other class members, and to
protect society's interest in the orderly administration of estates.150 Thus,
the New York State Legislature should enact the amendment proposed by
this Note, making New York one of the few states that have acted to
address the rights of posthumously conceived children. 151
147 See supra text accompanying notes 21-24.
148 See supra note 9.
149 See supra Introduction.
150 See supra Part III.B.
151 Although this paper proposes an amendment to New York State's EPTL, other states could, and
should, benefit from this Note's proposal by using it as a model from which to amend their owns laws to
reflect the rapid advancements in biotechnology.
